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litigating position that the six-year period
applies in overstated-basis situations.
Treasury sought to apply the amended
regulation to all open cases, including
ones in which judicial decisions had
been rendered but had not yet become
final. Taxpayers challenged the validity of
the amended regulation. A split among
the lower courts caused the Supreme
Court to hear the issue.
In Home Concrete, the Court held for
the taxpayer, invalidating the regulation.
The Court was seriously divided,
however. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion
which three other justices joined in full.
Justice Scalia concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment. Justice
Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion which
three other justices joined.

Taxpayer-Friendly Aspects
Three aspects of Home Concrete will be
encouraging to taxpayers. The first, of
course, is the holding. As noted, most of
the recent cases—including Home
Concrete itself—involved tax shelters. As
a result of the Supreme Court’s holding,
decisions have been or will be entered
for taxpayers in these cases. It has been
estimated that the government will lose
as much as $1 billion in revenue. But
not just tax shelter “investors” and
promoters will be cheered by the Home
Concrete holding. The amended
regulation was not limited to tax shelters.
Non-shelter taxpayers were the unrepresented parties in interest in Home
Concrete and are equally the beneficiaries of it.
Second, Home Concrete vindicates
rule-of-law values. To me and many
others, the government’s conduct had a
“the ends justify the means” quality
about it. The government’s briefs in this
line of cases repeatedly stressed that the
case involved a tax shelter. So what?
Short of fraud, the nature of the
transaction is irrelevant to the statute of
limitations. To paraphrase Matthew
5:45, the Code causes the sunlight of
section 6501 to shine on both the good
and the bad taxpayers.

One of the main rule-of-law values is
protecting reasonable reliance interests.
“[J]ustifiable taxpayer reliance” was
important to Justice Scalia. 132 S. Ct. at
1846. The four dissenters also cared
about this value although they thought
the state of the law to be too uncertain
to imperil “legitimate settled
expectations.” Id. at 1853. We may hope
that this strand of Home Concrete is
reflected in future tax cases involving
reasonable reliance.
Third, Home Concrete helps allay
fears arising from Mayo. Mayo held that
challenges to tax regulations generally
are evaluated under the deferential
Chevron two-step, see Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and
it dispatched some of the stock
contentions taxpayers had been using to
challenge regulations. Many feared that
these holdings, especially when
combined with other rules deferential to
agencies, could dramatically tip the
scales in the government’s favor in future
tax litigation.
One of those other deferential rules
emanates from National Cable &
Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
In that case, the Court held that an
agency may, by regulation, trump a prior
judicial construction of a statute as long
as the regulation is Chevron entitled and
the prior court did not reach its result
based on an unambiguous statute. Yet
neither Mayo, nor Brand X, nor their
combination saved the regulation at
issue in Home Concrete. Taxpayers may
thus hope that, despite Mayo, we are not
in a “deference run riot” world.
At least some of the initial
encouragement produced by Home
Concrete may fade, however. Having
found litigation and regulation unavailing,
the government may now turn to
legislation. Treasury could ask Congress
to amend section 6501(e) to incorporate
the position in the amended regulation
(although preoccupation with the
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upcoming elections might delay such
action).
Moreover, a 4–1–4 decision is hardly
so firm a foundation as to inspire
unbridled confidence that rule-of-law
values will be honored in future litigation
and that pro-government rules of
deference will not be applied to shield
overly zealous tax administration. In
short, enthusiasm about the pro-taxpayer
aspects of Home Concrete must be
tempered by awareness of what the
future may bring.

Problems with Home Concrete
There are two unfortunate aspects of the
Court’s decision. First, important issues
in the intersection of tax and administrative law were unresolved by the decision
despite their having been briefed by the
parties and the amici. Here are three
examples. (1) When are tax regulations
invalid because of their retroactivity?
Only the dissent addressed this, and its
remarks were brief. See 132 S. Ct. at
1853. (2) Does Brand X empower
agencies to trump even Supreme Court
decisions? Home Concrete addressed
this only situationally (in terms of
Colony), not globally. (3) Treasury had
adopted the amended regulation initially
as a temporary regulation which did not
go through the notice-and-comment
process prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. section
553. The subsequent final regulation did
go through notice-and-comment. Does
the initial failure to follow the APA taint
the later exercise that did follow the APA?
The lower courts disagreed about this;
yet the Supreme Court was silent as to
the question. These and other important
matters will have to be addressed
through possibly protracted future
litigation. Opportunities were missed in
Home Concrete.
The second problem is even worse.
I and a growing number of others
believe that Chevron is a disaster. For
many reasons (detailed in part in the
forthcoming Virginia Tax Review article
cited above), Chevron was misguided
when originally decided, and it has
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only gotten worse as a result of
subsequent decisions.
Two of the problems with Chevron are
the unpredictability of its application and
the ease with which it can be
manipulated by judges to accommodate
results-oriented decision-making. Home
Concrete exacerbates these problems.
There are two competing models as to
the proper roles of courts and agencies.
The “independent judgment” model puts
courts at the center of statutory
interpretation. E.g., Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the
law is.”). The Court rejected that
approach in Chevron, following instead a
model in which courts defer
substantially, though not entirely, to
agencies. Brand X followed the logic of

that deferential model to a perhaps
uncomfortable extreme.
Chevron became worse when, in
Mead and other subsequent cases, the
Court held that Chevron applies only
sometimes in agency cases and when it
rejected possible bright lines for when
Chevron does and does not apply. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2001).
Home Concrete does to Brand X what
Mead did to Chevron. The Court could
have chosen a bright line, such as that
Brand X authorizes agencies to overturn
only decisions of the lower courts, not
those of the Supreme Court. But
(unsurprisingly given the fact that Justice
Breyer wrote the opinion) the Home
Concrete plurality eschewed this and all
other bright lines.

Instead, if the plurality’s approach
holds in future cases, Brand X will
require at least two separate inquiries:
(1) whether the statute is ambiguous
and (2) if it is, whether Congress
intended to delegate to Treasury and
the Service the power to fill the gap.
See 132 S. Ct. at 1843–44. This makes
decision-making less predictable and
more readily manipulable.
Justice Scalia accused the Home
Concrete plurality of “revising yet again
the meaning of Chevron— and revising it
yet again in a direction that will create
confusion and uncertainty,” thus making
the Court’s “judicial-review jurisprudence
curiouser and curiouser.” Id. at 1847
(emphasis in original), 1848. Sadly, that
may be the most enduring legacy of
Home Concrete. n
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